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Abstract 
All three parties principally responsible for the Vilnius fiasco are to blame, each in their very different way: the 
EU for having drafted agreements with an inadequate balance between incentives and obligations, and 
vulnerable as a result to Putin’s aim to torpedo the whole process in favour of his misconceived Eurasian Union, 
while Yanukovich tried playing geo-political games that left him personally and the Ukrainian state as Putin’s 
hostage. It will require a major recalibration of policies to get this unstable new status quo back onto sound 
strategic lines, and proposals are advanced along three tracks in parallel: for rebuilding the remnants of the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy, for attempting to get Russia to take Lisbon to Vladivostok seriously, and for promoting a 
Greater Eurasia concept fit for the 21st century that would embrace the whole of the European and Asian 
landmass.  
 
The wording in the title borrows from two celebrated Russian novels of the nineteenth 
century, by Alexander Hertzen and Nikolai Chernyschevsky, who were advocating 
revolution with a view to Russia’s democratic modernisation1. One can speculate that they 
would have been excited by the Ukrainian Orange revolution of 2004, with at least the 
original Kiev Rus core of the Russian empire showing the way towards liberty, but 
exasperated by its subsequent mismanagement, and then excited again by the EuroMaidan 
uprising at the end of 2013 intent on throwing out Yanukovich’s corrupt oligarchal 
autocracy, but then exasperated again to see Russia’s present day tsar come to Yanukovic’s 
rescue lest the virus of democratic revolution spread to Moscow. 
Which brings us to Vilnius. The EU’s summit meeting in the Lithuanian capital on 29 
November 2013 had been billed as an historic event, with four Eastern partner states – 
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine – due to sign or initial in each case a 1000 page 
                                                   
1 Alexander Hertzen, Кто виноват? (Who is to blame?) (1846), and Nikolai Chernyschevsky, “Что 
делать?” (What is to be done?) (1862).  
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long Association Agreement (AA), incorporating as core content a Deep and Comprehensive 
Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). This would mark a further strategic advance of the 
‘Europeanisation’ of Eastern Europe, following almost a decade after the EU’s major 
enlargement into Central Europe. While these four states had not been granted their wishes 
to have the perspective of EU membership officially recognised, it seems to have been 
intention to crown the Vilnius event with a political declaration heading in that direction2.  
The first warning that the scenario might unravel had come on 3 September 2013 when 
Armenia suddenly renounced proceeding with its agreement with the EU, as announced by 
President Sargsyan after a bilateral meeting in Moscow with President Putin, preferring to 
instead to join the Russian-led customs union. Russia was already punishing in advance 
Moldova and Ukraine with trade sanctions as warnings not to go ahead with the EU. And 
then on 9 November, following a meeting with Putin, President Yanukovich performed his 
U-turn, withdrawing from signing in Vilnius, leaving the script for the big event in tatters.  
Who is to blame? 
There is plenty of blame all round. But let’s start with EU, since it was their show in Vilnius, 
so its success or failure. If Russia was able to be the wrecker, the EU must have miscalculated 
somewhere along the line to have made this possible.  
The European story 
From beginning of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, almost a decade ago, 
criticisms were made by many independent observers that the proposed ‘action plans’ saw 
an inadequate matching of incentives from the EU alongside the reform-oriented obligations 
that the partner states were expected to follow3.  
This did not change as the years went by. On the contrary as the AA/DCFTAs were drafted 
the obligations were deepened, as one can now observe in the initialled texts, which lay out 
commitments to comply with around 300 to 400 EU legal acts (see Annex A), but without 
acceptance by the EU to include the sacred language ‘membership perspective’, or pre-
accession partnership assistance as being granted to Balkan states. The huge loading of EU 
legislation in the AA/DCFTA with Ukraine, which was the first text to be negotiated and 
served as template for the Armenian, Georgian and Moldovan texts, seems to be only a 
lightened version of what Norway accepts as part of its European Economic Area (EEA). As 
for the EEA the DCFTAs contain a commitment for the partner states to keep up with future 
EU legislation, either amendments to old texts or new ones.     
The blame has to be shared by the political leaders of EU member states and the technocrats 
in the Commission. The politicians are primarily to blame for being unable to overcome 
disagreement over whether the East Europeans should be granted ‘membership perspective’. 
This was of course in itself not an easy issue, but still a matter for strategic choice. On the one 
hand the EU was worried about over-stretch, of undermining the integrity of the system in 
the event of excessively fast enlargement into Eastern Europe, or of creating unrealistic 
expectations. On the other hand everybody could see that the spectacular transformation and 
                                                   
2 The summit’s draft conclusions included such language, but this disappeared in the final text after 
Ukraine’s refusal to sign its AA/DCFTA. See on this point Steven Blockmans and Hrant Kostanyan, 
‘A Post-Mortem of the Vilnius Summit: Not yet a Thessaloniki Moment for the Eastern Partnership’, 
CEPS Commentary, December 2013.  
3 See, for example, Michael Emerson, The Wider Europe Matrix, CEPS Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 2004. 
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Europeanisation of Central Europe had been driven by the EU accession perspective. For 
example the current President of Estonia, Tomas Ilves, formerly chief negotiator with the EU 
and later Member of the European Parliament, has repeatedly said that his country would 
never have accepted all the incredibly heavy burdens of the EU legislation if this had not 
been part of the membership package.   
With the politicians not able to make up their minds clearly the ball was passed to the 
technocrats in the Commission to ‘do something’ to avoid that the new neighbours after the 
2004 enlargement feel discouraged from heading in the direction of European political 
values and economic reform. The task was allocated to the relevant departments of the 
Commission, who set about doing what they had experience of, namely to follow the 
accession model in reviewing every aspect of the partner state’s policies from the standpoint 
of compliance with EU norms, standards and regulations. There was early on an ‘Action 
Plan’ drawn up for Ukraine in the aftermath of the 2004 Orange revolution, with a huge 
number of action points, which the Yushchenko-Timoshenko regime was nowhere near able 
to implement, even before the leaders were driven apart by personal animosities.   
The process took firmer shape when negotiations began with Ukraine several years later 
over what became the DCFTAs. The doctrine had been shaped in Brussels that a simple free 
trade agreement, based on the phasing out of tariffs, would have only a minor impact on the 
economy compared to a deep agreement that would eliminate not only technical barriers to 
trade but go way further into major fields of domestic regulatory policies (financial markets, 
competition, etc.), and link to political reform (democratic institutions, rule of law, de-
corruption). Support for this big reform agenda came not only from the EU’s own 
enlargement experience, but also from broader studies by the World Bank and EBRD 
showing how important ‘good governance’ was for economic performance.  
As a result the Commission’s ‘negotiation’ method was hardly a negotiation at all, but rather 
a system running on ‘automatic pilot’, in which the Directorate General for Trade 
coordinated the collection from other Directorates General responsible for various sectors of 
the EU policies their lists of EU laws for copying and pasting into the draft treaty. The 
negotiation element was mainly reduced to agreeing the time delay over which compliance 
was to be achieved, mostly ranging between 2 and 8 years. The Ukrainian text came first and 
served as template for Armenia, Georgia and Moldova with only minor differences. For 
example the Ukrainian text sees foresaw compliance with 64 legal acts in the financial 
services sector, 28 for environmental policy, 39 for labour and social policy, 59 for 
agriculture, 32 for technical standards, etc. (Annex A). The automatic pilot was appropriate 
and transparent for the accession process, but its logic for the Eastern neighbours was 
undermined by the refusal of the EU to agree to grant membership perspectives to the 
Eastern partners. In the wholesale listing of EU legislation there was no apparent impact 
assessment or screening for those that did, or did not fit well with the priorities and 
capacities of the partner state. The Commission side could say that it was for the partner 
state to work out its own impact assessments, but its approach was more of a ‘take it or leave 
it’ character. The ‘negotiations’ were totally non-transparent for the outsider, and too 
complex for even the insiders such as foreign ministry officials in either the EU or the partner 
states to comprehend at a general level. For those in doubt, try studying the 1000 page texts.  
If the process had been more transparent then at least independent experts would have been 
able to contribute to impact assessments. As it was, the texts were kept secret in the time-
honoured custom of trade negotiators, as if the negotiation process was a game of poker, 
whereas in reality the Commission was simply laying out its lists of legal acts for the 
partners to take or leave. Various feasibility studies were done at the request of the 
Commission, and these generally came to the conclusion that ‘simple’ free trade would 
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deliver only minor benefits compared to ‘deep’ free trade. However these results were 
driven by simplified assumptions about the removal non-tariff barriers and improvements in 
economic governance equivalent in effect 4 . There were no sector by sector analyses, 
identifying which sectors would see serious adjustment costs, such as through adoption of 
EU standards in the agricultural sector or the impact of environmental standards in 
metallurgical industries. The general doctrine was that the EU legislation could be taken as 
proxy for good governance, and that while there would be pluses and minuses, the overall 
impact would be substantially beneficial.   
While there could be serious doubts over the implementation capabilities of the partner 
states faced with these hundreds of legislative obligations, there could still be a rationale. 
This was that in a regime suffering from the suffocating and corrupt collusion between 
politicians, officials and local oligarchs there was no other way of driving a comprehensive 
domestic reform agenda. Inside observers from Moldova report that this was basically the 
deliberate choice of the pro-European government of Moldova.  
But the case of Georgia tells a different story. Here the post-Rose revolution government had 
embarked on a radical economic liberalisation and de-corruption programme of its own 
initiative well before the negotiations for the AA/DCFTA. In particular Georgia 
implemented a unilateral and unconditional free trade policy with zero tariffs towards not 
only the EU but the whole of the world. It also unilaterally recognised all EU or international 
standards for its imports. It further pursued a drastic de-regulation policy as key to its de-
corruption objective, and took a sceptical view of some of the EU’s regulatory practices, 
considering that they risked contradicting the de-regulation policy and imposing heavy 
regulatory burdens at an inappropriate time. Georgia in fact achieved spectacular 
improvements in its governance ratings all by itself. While also aspiring to EU membership it 
would have liked best a quick and relatively simple free trade agreement with the EU, since 
it was for the EU itself to reciprocate Georgia’s unilateral liberalisation policy already 
executed. But the Directorate General for Trade of the Commission was inflexible, insisting 
that only a deep and comprehensive agreement, with very extensive commitments to comply 
with EU law, was worth doing. In order to drive the point home the Commission insisted 
that Georgia shows its willingness to comply with a lot of EU legislation as pre-condition for 
even the opening of negotiations. What could explain such a position given that Georgia had 
already liberalised5? It seems that the Commission did not want to be bothered by the 
complications of a differentiated approach for one small Eastern neighbour.   
Basically the DCFTA template was accepted, in spite of concerns about overload, because the 
East European states could regard it as buying a guarantee of European status and thence 
geo-political protection for their independence from Russia, as well as a roadmap for 
economic reform. 
                                                   
4 For example, Michael Emerson et al., The Prospect of Deep Free Trade between the EU and Ukraine, CEPS 
Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 2006. While this study was drawing on accepted methodologies for 
assessing the  benefits of improve economic governance, the present author was astonished later to 
see in the draft AA/DCFTA the huge and indiscriminating collection of EU legal acts that were taken 
as proxy for ‘good governance’.  
5 This story is analysed in detail in Patrick Messerlin, Michael Emerson, Gia Janderi and Alexandre Le 
Vernoy in An Appraisal of the EU’s Trade Policy towards its Eastern Neighbours – The case of Georgia, CEPS 
Paperback, CEPS, Brussels, 2011.  
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The Russian story 
If the EU as architect had designed a building with insecure foundations, Putin was the 
demolition expert who attacked it with the wrecking ball. Putin announced his ambition of 
creating a Eurasian Union in his campaign speeches before his re-election to the presidency 
in March 2012. Until then there had been no particular tensions between the EU and Russia 
over the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). At the beginning of the ENP in 2005 Russia 
had declined to join the party with the smaller former Soviet states because of its ‘great 
power’ status. But there were ongoing negotiations with the EU over four ‘common spaces’ 
and a new agreement to succeed the existing Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that 
had been drawn up in the early post-Soviet years.. More recently the then President 
Medvedev had been working with the EU on a ‘modernisation partnership’ programme. All 
of this marked out Russia’s distinctive status, with no particular friction over the ENP or 
later the Eastern Partnership; only occasional dismissive remarks from Ambassador 
Chizhov, Moscow’s representative in Brussels, about these initiatives being of little effect. 
Then when Putin returned as president again in March 2012, that all changed. Attempts to 
find alternative formulae to the unsuccessful CIS had been ongoing for some years, notably 
with the Eurasian Economic Community. In his re-election campaign speeches and writings 
Putin announce the creation of a Eurasian Union as his foreign policy priority. The crucial 
change came with his decision as first operational step to make a customs union with Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, i.e. to extend Russia’s external tariff to the other two, and to encourage or 
push other European and Central Asian states of the CIS to join too. Of these Ukraine, 
Moldova, Armenia and Georgia were already negotiating AA/DCFTAs with the EU. Of 
course in the absence of free trade between the customs union and the EU this would mean 
torpedoing the DCFTA as the core of the Association Agreements. It would have been 
possible for these states to negotiate improved free trade agreements with the customs union 
alongside DCFTAs with the EU. But the Kremlin refused to consider this, and so the customs 
union proposition became a Russian declaration of confrontation with the EU and its Eastern 
partners.  
Putin was then hinting at advantages it could offer Ukraine by way of gas price favours. If he 
had simply been making generous offers to help Ukraine at a time of great difficulty – to 
help a friend in need - the EU could hardly object. Let Ukraine freely choose what it wants. 
But Putin did not stop there, and Russia began to administer threats and punitive sanctions 
to pressurise Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia into not signing or initialling the 
agreements with the EU. In the case of Ukraine there were punitive trade restrictions, 
ranging from harmful customs delays to the ridiculous affair of Ukrainian chocolates that 
had suddenly become a health hazard for the Russian people (which was almost certainly 
contestable at the WTO). Putin sought to justify this with the argument that Russia would be 
flooded with EU goods transiting through Ukraine. But this is a bogus argument. The rules 
of the WTO determine the origin of traded products. EU exports to Ukraine would remain 
‘made in the EU’ and thus subject to Russian tariffs if re-exported to Russia, unless they had 
been used as inputs into Ukrainian products with a substantial  Ukrainian value-added to 
become ‘made in Ukraine’ (for which there are precise rules of calculation) and imported free 
of duty into Russia.  
Moldova has for years been hit by the on and off banning of its wine exports, depending on 
the political humour of the Kremlin, but this is an old story such that Moldova has now 
reduced its reliance on the Russian market from 80% to 25%. However Moscow’s special 
representative for Moldova, Dmitri Rogozin, amplified the threats and psychological warfare 
with the well-reported remark that he hoped ‘that Moldova would not freeze this winter’, 
implying possible cuts in gas supplies if Moldova went ahead with the EU. There was also 
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the perceived threat of discrimination against the large Moldovan diaspora resident in 
Russia, bearing in mind earlier Georgian experiences of such measures. 
Putin’s policy can be criticised broadly as being largely contrary to Russia’s objective 
economic and political interests. The customs union is a bad economic choice when Russia’s 
real economic priority must be to get on to a deep modernisation path. The customs union 
serves to protect the status quo. It offers no significant opportunities for achieving economies 
of scale, given the small size of the non-Russian economies. It offers no new access to 
advanced industrial technologies. Worse still, by forming a customs union with non-WTO 
countries it locks itself out of entering into any free trade agreement with major global 
economies, be it the EU, the US,  China, or India. Kazakhstan for its part had to accept a 
raising of its tariffs to Russian levels, which it did reluctantly. Belarus for its part has already 
extracted significant financial concessions out of Russia, with President Lukashenko 
displaying talent for reverse blackmail, criticising how the customs union damages the 
Belarus economy until he secured a $2 billion loan6. Kyrgyzstan, which says it wants to join 
the customs union, bargains for subsidies as quid pro quo. As a WTO member already, it 
will faces difficulties or penalties in raising too its tariffs, and damage to its very important 
trading relationship with its Chinese neighbour.  So the costs mount up for Russia, to which 
are now added a big bill for Ukraine even without agreement to join the customs union. 
The suggestions vaguely mentioned in press conferences that Turkey and India are said to be 
interested in the customs union are of no real substance, with various polite diplomatic 
statements of interest being talked up on the Russian side as misleading  propaganda. These 
important countries may be interested in discussing various Eurasian perspective, but the 
idea of their joining the customs union is mere fantasy.   
The political aspects of the drive for a Eurasian Union are hardly more promising. This is set 
to be a club of corrupt, oligarchal, autocratic or semi-autocratic regimes, coupled to one or 
more would–be democracies that have been taken by Russia as geo-political hostage, with 
the possible addition of some semi-failed states from Central Asia such as Kyrgyzstan next 
and possible Tajikistan later. In the immortal words of Groucho Marx, ‘who would want to 
join a club I am a member of?’ The fact that Russia chose coercive measures to pursue 
expansion of the customs union is a formula for ultimate failure. Plurilateral integration 
cannot be sustained in the globalising 21st century by coercion. Even Kazakhstan, the most 
loyal supporter of the Eurasian idea, is firmly against political integration that would limit its 
independent sovereignty. The idea of Eurasian integration fits badly with Russian society’s 
own aggressive resistance to seeing more Central Asian immigrants in its cities, which links 
also to Russia’s inability to manage to own Muslim minorities. Do post-Soviet generations of 
Russians really want to become Eurasian? 
The crucial point in both the Armenian and Ukrainian cases lies in the definition of the 
frontier between the legitimate offer of incentives versus punitive measures, geo-political 
hostage taking and blackmail. This frontier is to a degree marked out by international norms, 
such as the basic principles of the Helsinki Final Act, which rule out coercive behaviour 
between states. But more important here for Russia to reflect upon is not what some OSCE 
lawyer might say, but the conclusions freely drawn by the international community and 
mobile investors. The government that gives itself a reputation for coercive measures, 
                                                   
6 For a detailed exposition of current difficulties in Belarus-Russian relations see Arkady Moshes, 
‘Lukashenka as Machiavelli’, Johnson’s Russia List, 10 January 2014 (http://russialist.org/lukashenka-
as-machiavelli/). 
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blackmail and a compliant judiciary will not be trusted. And this becomes a huge self-
inflicted wound for Russia, which currently cannot persuade its own wealthy business 
interests to repatriate their flight capital, or create a business climate attractive to 
international investors who could do much to improve the Russian economy’s 
modernisation and competitiveness. 
The only ‘positive’ seems to be Putin’s ability to draw on the historical resonance of his 
actions to sustain his own political legitimacy, and to score 19th century style geo-political 
victories in ‘winning’ Armenia and Ukraine against the West. One may keep in mind 
Russia’s historic self-identification as leader of the Slavs and the Orthodox Christians as one 
of its national myths, alternating however with the Europeanist drives of Peter the Great and 
others that followed. A recurrent syndrome over the centuries was for the Tsar, when 
disappointed by failures in Europe, to look to eastern expansion into Central Asia and the 
Far East, as for example with Alexander II’s policy after the Crimean war. Putin mimics all 
this. He goes to Kyiv in the summer of 2013 in company with the Patriarch of All Russia 
declaring that Ukrainians and Russian are one people. And he does this while also espousing 
a Eurasian Union, which shuts the door on Western Europe and makes for some confusion of 
ideas, not least for Ukrainians who are absolutely disinterested in the idea of re-integration 
with Central Asia. 
The Armenian story 
The first sign of how determined Putin was to enlarge the customs union at the expense of 
the EU’s plans for the Vilnius summit came all of a sudden on 3 September 2013. President 
Sargsyan of Armenia was in Moscow to meet with Putin, and at their concluding press 
conference Sargsyan simply announced his U-turn, in renouncing the DCFTA in favour of 
joining the customs union, without giving any explanation then or later of why, beyond that 
it was in Armenia’s interests. The removal of customs procedures could hardly be of benefit 
to Armenia’s economy, given the absence of any direct land border, and the need to transit 
through Georgia or Azerbaijan. The only beneficiaries might be the owners of enterprises 
that would be protected from international competition, including large segments of the 
economy owned by Russian business interests. However that was surely not the main point, 
compared to the manifest geo-political objective for Russia of rebuilding its sphere of 
influence while undermining Europeanising and democratising tendencies. Russia’s leverage 
was immediately recognised in Armenia as being based on two factors, a strategic security 
guarantee in the face of the serious threat of renewed war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno 
Karabakh, and the exposure of the large Armenian diaspora in Russia to the humour of the 
Kremlin. On the strategic security point it was noticed that Putin had himself visited Baku 
only a few days earlier, cementing deals worth $4 billion to supply advanced weaponry to 
Azerbaijan. So Russia first sold weapons to Armenia’s enemy, and then warned Armenia 
that it could not count on Russia’s protection against these weapons if it failed to join the 
customs union – such is the interpretation widely made in Armenia. Moreover, as 
Armenians point out, the EU was unwilling to provide any kind of security guarantee, so 
they had no choice. As regards the diaspora, Russia had already some years ago showed its 
willingness to hit the Georgian diaspora with harmful and disagreeable discrimination at 
times when the Kremlin judged Georgia’s policies to be insufficiently friendly. The 
vulnerability of the Armenian diaspora to similar measures, and to the important flow of 
migrant remittances which are vital to the Armenian economy, was therefore also a manifest 
concern. The overall conclusion has to be that the Armenian leadership was subject to 
unbearable pressures.   
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And finally the Ukrainian story 
The pity of it all is that the leaders of the Orange revolution messed up their opportunity a 
decade ago. President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Timoshenko failed completely to 
translate the popular uprising that they had spearheaded into satisfying demands of the 
people for better governance.  
When Yanukovich became president in April 2010 there were no illusions in the EU over 
what to expect. But he still astounded observers with the ineptitude of his first major 
decision. While flying first to Brussels as a sham show to confirm Ukraine’s European choice, 
he then went to Moscow and granted Russia a 25 year extension of the Sevastopol naval base 
lease, alongside a poorly defined gas price discount. As a result Russia has its long lease on 
Stavropol but Ukraine has been paying much more for its gas than Germany. Something 
went badly wrong there.  
A next move by Yanukovich was to have Yulia Timoshenko removed from the political stage 
as opposition leader. She was thus prosecuted, condemned and imprisoned for abuse of 
power when in office as prime minister, alongside other personalities of the former 
government. As is well known, this became a cause celebre, with the EU having set in 
December 2012 an end to ‘selective justice’ as a condition amongst others for signing the 
AA/DCFTA. An open question has been whether the EU, in choosing to set this as 
condition, was making itself responsible for ‘losing Ukraine’. While the question has been 
debated in EU circles, the evidence seems to be contrary to this view, as the precise sequence 
of events in November showed.  
Yanukovich went to meet Putin on 9 November. In the week before all lights were on green 
for Vilnius, with positive statements by Prime Minister Azorov about signing, and the Rada 
preparing to adopt a law that would allow Yulia Timoshenko to leave prison for medical 
treatment in Germany, and with Yanukovich saying all that was needed was due legal 
process, and he could sign the ‘Yulia law’ immediately. 
From the meeting with Putin there was initially no news. But in the next days when the Rada 
was due to pass the Yulia law, the Speaker declared suddenly that the law was not ready, 
and on the same day the government announced they had suspended negotiations with the 
EU over signing at Vilnius. This triggered the EuroMaidan protest movement. Was 
Yanukovich was just playing a game, to encourage Putin to make even more generous offers, 
organising a grand Ukraine auction? Or was he blackmailed by Putin: either you join my 
customs union or you will get so hurt that you will not survive politically? Maybe a bit of 
both, but Yanukovich’s attempted game led himself into being trapped by Putin.  
The core elements of the deal were a pledge of financial assistance up to $15 billion, a cut in 
the price of gas by one-third and various industrial deals. The loans and gas price cuts were 
large numbers for Yanukovich to take home, enough to take the momentum out of the 
EuroMaidan for the time being, but not to extinguish it. Why should Russia be so generous, 
as a journalist asked Putin? ‘Fraternal friendship’ was his answer. He might have added that 
both items are subject to review on a three monthly basis, implying that if Ukraine broke 
with the conditions, either or both concessions would stop. But what are the conditions? 
Nothing is transparent. For sure if Yanukovich returned to sign with the EU the concessions 
would stop. Was there also a commitment to join the customs union in due course? This was 
denied by both sides, and in any case if such were to be a condition the EuroMaidan would 
explode.  
The first tranche of $3 billion aid has been executed, with Russia buying Ukrainian paper in 
the market, out of the $15 billion pledged. The terms are for reimbursement in two years. 
There are no conditions of a type that go with IMF funding, which was cited as a great 
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benefit. Ukraine was otherwise on the brink of bankruptcy. But in the absence of corrective 
economic policy measures, IMF-style, Ukraine will again be on the brink of bankruptcy 
within two years. So the terms are financially irresponsible, and just a device to help 
Yanukovich survive until his next election rendezvous in early 2015 and achieve political 
leverage for Russia.  
The gas price reduction granted by Putin from $400 per ’000m2 to $268 is a substantial if 
temporary concession. By how much? Gazprom reports that in 2013 its average sales price to 
European markets was $380 per ‘000 m3. The price for Ukraine should in principle be around 
$20 less than the European average given the shorter transport distance to Kiev7. In this light 
the charging of $400 to Ukraine reflected Gazprom’s abuse of its monopolistic position and 
Ukraine’s weak bargaining power.  
For the time being Ukraine is set on increasing its gas imports again from Russia, from 26-27 
b.c.m. in 2013 to 30-33 b.c.m. in 20148. If a reasonable Ukrainian market-based price were 
$360 (380 less 20), and with imports from Russia in 2014 at a 30 b.c.m. level, the concessional 
price of $268 would translate into an annual saving of $2.8 billion, or $700 million per 
quarter. Overall Russia’s gas price discount is significant only for the short-run, both because 
Russia itself offers it only on a three-monthly basis, presumably to be cancelled if Ukraine 
returns to signing with the EU, and because Ukraine is on a path towards deceasing 
dependence on Russian supplies, given its large shale gas resources being developed. In 
addition Gazprom’s monopolistic practices are under increasing pressure from both world 
market conditions for gas and a major anti-trust case from the EU currently underway9. A 
next Ukrainian government may be expected to drive all the harder for gas independence.  
For Brussels it was obvious enough that Yanukovich’s declarations about Ukraine’s 
European choice were just tactical rhetoric. Yanukovich sought to justify his U-turn with 
claims that the DCFTA would cost Ukraine $168 billion, and that the EU offered insufficient 
compensation for this. Where this number came from was never revealed, only that a few 
days later it was revised down to $10 billion, confirming for the EU that Yanukovich’s 
administration was totally unreliable.  His real priorities are understood in Ukraine itself full 
well to be his preservation of power and enrichment of the ‘family’. European values about 
democracy and human rights mean nothing to him. And the idea that the Ukrainian 
economy should benefit from a less corrupt and more open and competitive regime is 
contrary to his political and financial interests.   
And so on to the EuroMaidan. Let us take the symbolism of demolishing the statue to Lenin 
in central Kiev, with the words attached to his decapitated head …’Yanukovich, you are 
next’, as meaning on the one hand running together the feelings felt towards Putin’s neo-
Soviet pressurisation and Yanukovich’s banditry; and then on the other hand the running 
together of the European and Ukrainian flags as rallying symbols for the EuroMaidan. For 
the masses in the Maidan there was little knowledge about the AA/DCFTA, but there is 
political understanding that Europe stands for democracy, rule of law, human rights and 
decent governance. 
                                                   
7 A rule of thumb for gas pipeline transit fees is $1 per ‘000 m3 per 100 km. Since Kiev is about 2000 
km closer to Russia than the major European markets in the German Ruhr or Paris region, the margin 
of lighter transit costs might amount to around $20 per ‘000 m3 for delivery to Kiev. Source for 
detailed data: Energy Charter Secretariat, ‘Gas Transit Tariffs in Selected ECT Countries’, 2006. 
8  Reuters, 9 January 2014 (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/09/ukraine-russia-gas-
idUSL6N0KJ0YP20140109). 
9 See Alan Riley, “Commission versus Gazprom – The anti-trust clash of the century”, CEPS Policy 
Brief, CEPS, Brussels, October 2012. 
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For its part the Yanukovich administration tries to repress the EuroMaidan with measures 
rushed through the Rada on 16 January with irregular voting procedures, which criminalises 
typical activities of EuroMaidan demonstrators and supporters. Is Ukraine’s regime 
becoming a bigger Belarus or a smaller Russia?  
What is to be done?  
Between them the three main parties, EU, Ukraine and Russia, have created a new strategic 
status quo which is a big mess. The EU’s neighbourhood policy is in tatters. Ukraine is in a 
state of deep political and economic crisis, as well as having surrendered its independence. 
And Russia, while having scored some tactical geo-political points, it has done so on terms 
that will come back to haunt it with endemic political conflict and financial liabilities. 
Relations between the EU and Russia descend to the most serious confrontation and distrust 
since the end of the Cold War, with the possible exception of the 2008 war in Georgia.   
But out of this ugly situation there should constructed a fresh start, and fresh strategic 
thinking on the side of the EU in particular. The general political context in the EU makes 
this opportune. With the economy recovering from the euro crisis, and a new political period 
about to begin with renewal of the European Parliament and the leadership of the 
Commission and European Council, with the drift towards euro-sceptic populism 
widespread, there is a political market for ideas for a major advance in EU foreign policy.  
Building on the remnants of the Eastern Partnership 
The neighbourhood policy is now hardly more than a reference to a geographic space of 
proximity to the EU. This is so for both East and South. For the South it suffices for the 
present paper to note that the revolutionary convulsions of the Arab world has left all of the 
rest of the world, including the US, EU and Russia, powerless to restrain the descent of much 
of the region into violent chaos, or civil war, or reversion to military rule, or state failure.  
For the East the nice but naive idea of a single policy towards the six states in question, 
alongside a sympathetic modernisation partnership with Russia, is dissolved into 
irrelevance. The European Neighbourhood Policy had a decade of well-meaning and 
exploratory testing. But it is now time to draw conclusions and move on with a set of 
radically differentiated and geo-politically relevant approaches, state by state.  
The EU wants to go ahead with Moldova and Georgia fast, with a view to signing the 
agreements by August 2014, before renewal of the EU institutions. That would be fine, and 
indeed highly desirable since Putin is clearly intent on getting both these two countries to 
follow in the footsteps of Armenia and Ukraine and withdraw from signing, and can be 
expected to try to exploit the political fragility of both countries to this end. However at the 
same time the EU should undertake a rebalancing of the incentives and obligations attached 
to the AA/DCFTAs. The EU has now to cross its Rubicon, and extend membership 
perspectives to these two countries, and accompany the signing and ratification of the 
treaties with inclusion of these two states into the family of pre-accession partnerships of 
South-East Europe.  
How should membership perspectives be reconciled with the unresolved cases of separatist 
regions – Transnistria for Moldova and Abkhazia and South Ossetia for Georgia? Moldova 
and Georgia should not be set conditions that they cannot themselves control, namely 
reintegration of the separatist regions. The time should come when one or other of the 
separatist entities decide they want to rejoin the core states. Maybe it will take decades, but 
maybe less, as and when the EU integration process and the material conditions in the core 
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states advance. Let the separatists come to their own conclusions. The EU should be in no 
hurry. 
Georgia now has energy independence from Russia, given the Azeri gas supplies being 
piped into and through its territory. Moldova is not yet there, as Dmitri Rogozin has 
menacingly reminded them. However a gas pipeline connection with Romania is being 
constructed, and the EU should support investment in it with a capacity sufficient to assure 
immunity from Russian gas geo-politics. For this the piping of Azeri gas into Bulgaria 
should also be linked up with Romania.  
As regards the now published and initialled DCFTA texts, there should now be set in motion 
impact assessments on the mass of EU laws whose compliance is agreed. This impact 
assessment should have been done before, not after. The screening process should identify 
elements where the adjustment costs look like being very high. In principle the economic 
structures of Moldova and Georgia should throw up only a limited number of cases. For 
example neither state has huge, old, polluting investments in heavy industry to contend 
with, unlike Ukraine. However where the costs of compliance are severe there should be a 
willingness by the EU to look for cooperative solutions.  
These could be of different categories: financial aid for renewal of investments in some cases, 
longer compliance delays in others. As for funding, there are grant resources that had been 
reserved for Armenia and Ukraine, and which could now be mobilised for Georgia and 
Moldova. In some fields, notably sanitary and phyto-sanitary (SPS) regulations for agri-food 
products and various industrial standards, the distinction can be made between products 
aimed at export marketing and those destined for home consumption only. Such a system is 
already used elsewhere, where precisely identified production chains are made SPS 
compliant, without these regulatory burdens being applied to small farmers that have no 
connection with international markets. There should be an openness on the EU side to 
arguments that some of the EU laws are not necessary as part of the package, and could be 
deleted or deferred. The debate about over-regulation in the EU itself is itself now so vivid 
that there is all the more reason for care and selectivity by the EU in what it demands of its 
Eastern partners, rather than indiscriminate demands for wholesale compliance with its 
regulatory models. The labour market and social policy domain is overloaded in the 
DCFTAs (do these states need the EU’s regulations such as for parental leave, which is one of 
the hundreds of items featuring in Annex A?).    
What is to be done with Ukraine? With Yanukovich, nothing, since he is not a valid partner. 
At his 9 November meeting with Putin, Yanukovich may have thought he was playing a 
game of geo-political poker. At any event the outcome is that he made Ukraine Russia’s 
hostage, locked into financial and gas price dependency on a three monthly basis. He may 
have saved his skin as president for little more than a year at the maximum, in exchange for 
surrendering his country’s independence.  
The Ukrainian government carries on pretending that they are renegotiating the DCFTA. On 
15 January Prime Minister Azarov instructed a working group to work out within two 
months negotiating proposals. 10  While Brussels is in no mood to negotiate the Prime 
Minister’s directives for his staff are worth noting. “The Prime Minister referred to the need to 
review current provisions on decreasing the export duty fees for sunflower seed, metal bars, animal 
hide, and also increase quotas for Ukrainian agriculture products’s export to the EU. Mykola Azarov 
also stated that the environmental commitments foreseen by the agreement are excessive for Ukrainian 
metallurgists, while new technical standards are unbearable for mechanic engineering industry. He 
                                                   
10 European Centre for Modern Ukraine, Weekly Newsletter, 15 January 2014. 
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also criticised the reform of the energy market as possibly leading to increasing electricity prices for 
households”. 
These are the most explicit statements of Ukrainian concerns, which deserve comment. As an 
economy with a huge trade deficit and one of the worst records for energy inefficiency for 
any industrialised country, the resistance to cutting export duties and raising energy prices is 
denial of the inevitable need for such measures. The export duties amount to a disincentive 
to export, and resistance to energy policy reform postpones any reduction in dependency on 
gas imports. The point about industrial standards is reinforcing the case for a consistent 
removal of non-tariff barriers between all three parties – Ukraine, Russia and the EU. 
Without adapting to international standards Ukrainian industry has no chance of prospering 
in the long-run. However the transition costs of the environmental commitments for 
metallurgists are a plausible example of what the negotiators should have been assessing 
already earlier. And the complaint about restrictive EU farm quotas is justified.        
Given its financial irresponsibility in extending large credits to Ukraine with no corrective 
policy conditions, Russia’s national wealth fund deserves to suffer a serious hair-cut on these 
credits. While the political objective of taking Ukraine hostage is obvious enough, what 
might the Russian authorities be anticipating financially for pay-back time in under two 
years? One can speculate that the politico-economic  assumption is that Ukraine would be 
obliged to settle its debts with other economic assets of strategic interest to Russia, for 
example the gas pipelines in which it has so far only a 50% share.  
But this scenario fails to take into account the EuroMaidan, the power of the Ukrainian 
people, and their demands for democracy and decent governance. In February-March 2015 
Ukraine will have presidential elections. At present Vitaly Klitschko, who is much more than 
world champion heavyweight boxer, is the most popular political contender for the 
presidency. If Putin styles himself as a macho president, he has found his match here. The 
EuroMaidan may fade for the time being, awaiting these elections. The likely scenario is that 
the opposition will win these elections, and any attempt by Yanukovic and his supporters to 
falsify them would bring the people back into the streets in overwhelming numbers, and 
risking a break up of the Ukrainian state.  
At this point Russia will have to come to terms with realities. Russian geo-political hard 
power may have trumped EU soft power in the short-run in both Armenia and Ukraine, but 
the democratic power of the Ukrainian people in alliance with a Europe of values will in due 
course trump old-fashioned Russian hard power. The example of Moldova and Georgia 
should be there as sign that the EU would be willing offer membership perspective to a 
sincerely pro-European, democratic and reformist government of Ukraine too. Attempts by 
Russia to further exploit its financial hold over Ukraine, like grabbing major Ukrainian 
economic assets, will back-fire. The negative image of Russia as a ruthless geo-political 
aggressor will further widen the chasm of ideological confrontation with the democratic 
Europe, with which the next Ukrainian leadership will identify. 
However the opposition leadership in Kiev should be preparing now for the situation they 
will be confronted with should one or other of them win the presidential election of 
February-March 2015. Here is a check-list of questions for them to be working on: 
 Can Klischko and Yatseniuk deeply pledge to work together cooperatively at the basic 
political level, and avoid the catastrophic Yushchenko-Timoshenko model of personal 
conflict? 
 Can they be more professional than Yushchenko and Timoshenko, who made speeches 
about how EU membership would solve all problems, but showed little ability to 
design and implement a reform programme? 
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 If yes and yes to the above, how will they go about preparing a government 
programme? Can they devise a decisive anti-corruption strategy like Georgia did after 
the Rose revolution?  
 Can they work out an informed view of where the DCFTA may be excessive in its 
obligations for Ukraine, i.e. in elements that would be hugely expensive to implement, 
such as maybe air and water environmental standards for metallurgical and power 
generating industries. Well documented arguments would have to be listened to by the 
EU, which has already hinted that extended implementation delays or assistance could 
be discussed. It already has experience of this kind of real problem, as with Poland’s 
coal burning power stations. But such issues would have to be handled in a 
professional manner, rather Yanukovich-style with his sudden and extravagant 
declaration that Ukraine needed $168 billion, or at second guess $10 billion, in 
compensation. 
 Can they work out an exit strategy for escaping from Russia's handcuffs, in the shape 
of the three month reviews for credit and gas price concessions? As and when a new 
administration faces its first financial crisis, this time it should go to the IMF with the 
EU offering to co-finance the package 50%, rather than its small minority offer so far 
made. The economic conditions set by the IMF, namely devaluation, a wage freeze, 
and increases in domestic gas prices are inevitable sooner or later. Russia’s zero 
macroeconomic conditions for credits are unsustainable, and will only lead Ukraine 
into collapse. The IMF/EU conditions should additionally include rescheduling of the 
short-term Russian credits, for example restructured into 15 years bonds, without 
which the IMF and EU should not simply refinance the irresponsible Russian credits.  
The EU for its part should be preparing quietly and carefully for this post-Yanukovich 
regime. It would need good answers to the above questions to go ahead with an AA/DCFTA 
supported by membership perspective. It could prepare for some constructive financial 
engineering projects, like over the need for Ukraine’s gas pipeline to be rehabilitated. Here 
the EU should not back away from possible trilateral initiatives, such as having European 
interests take a one-third share in Naftogaz, leaving Ukraine and Russia with the other two 
thirds. The European Investment Bank, the EBRD and some major European gas importing 
companies could inject substantial funds into the network, partly to buy its shares in what 
exists, and partly to contribute to new investment.   
For the other three Eastern Partnership states these is little to do. For Armenia the EU can 
remain a sympathetic friend, with an interest in encouraging civil society and democratic 
developments for which there is a basis in the country. Azerbaijan is equally disinterested in 
both the customs union and a DCFTA, and would like to have some kind of simplified 
agreement with the EU. This should be pursued by the EU. Azerbaijan’s dynastic regime 
may be disagreeably repressive of human rights, but the country performs a valuable role in 
diluting the Gazprom monopoly power and Russian geo-political power in South-East 
Europe. On Belarus there is even less to do, beyond extending encouraging gestures to civil 
society activists and such initiatives as the Belarus off-shore university in Vilnius, and 
waiting for change.   
Reaching for a concordat on Lisbon to Vladivostok 
The fundamental resolution of the big mess has to come through a return to the noble ideal 
of the Common European Home, or if one likes it, Putin’s slogan of a Europe from ‘Lisbon to 
Vladivostok’. This slogan is grafted on top of earlier efforts in the same spirit – not only the 
Common European House, but also the four Common Spaces, the Modernisation 
Partnership, etc. This succession of frustrated initiatives is at least a testimony to the 
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persistent intuition that the EU, Russia and all that lies between them have to find a formula 
for coming together in some civilised way.  
The core mechanism for giving substance to these ideas would be a free trade agreement 
between the EU and Russia. But this would need to be built upon with a wider and deeper 
common economic space between the EU and Russia, done in a manner that would be 
consistent with countries of the overlapping neighbourhoods such as Ukraine to have free 
trade with both; or to go the more radical route of forming a pan-European free trade area. 
The simple removal of tariffs between the EU and Russia would be a much easier 
proposition for the EU, since most of its imports from Russia are already tariff free, and so 
the content of the agreements should go much further. Russia’s imperative need to 
modernise its economy beyond the commodity sector means that it will have to undertake 
liberalising reforms, which was acknowledged by Putin in his state of the nation address on 
12 December 2013: “Economic freedom, private property and competition, but not state capitalism 
should be at the core of the new economic growth model”. The desirable common economic space 
should therefore also have ambitious content for industrial technology transfer and 
cooperation, common industrial standards, and a huge increase in training a new generation 
of Russian professionals with student exchanges through Erasmus-type programmes on a 
vast scale.   
At present the official Russian doctrine is that the customs union, and Eurasian Economic 
Union to crown it, have first to be completed, and then to be a basis for negotiation between 
equals with the EU. This doctrine suffers however from several flaws. First at the legal-
technical level, Belarus and Kazakhstan are not yet WTO members, and so the customs 
union has no status with the WTO, which makes it impossible for the EU that takes WTO 
rules seriously to make a free trade are with it. But the issue is too important to be held up by 
Lukashenko’s eccentricity. The primary political objective should be set, and then technical 
solutions found. Secondly, what are going to be the rules of the customs union in terms of 
non-tariff barriers and technical standards for goods and services? If these would be 
international or European standards (which are largely the same), this would not be a 
problem, but if these standards were some complicated blend of old Gosstandards and 
elements of their modernisation, then there would be a problem. Thirdly, there remains the 
important Ukraine question. It is already clear that attempts to coerce Ukraine into the 
customs union would have explosive political consequences. But it is still of the highest 
importance for the Ukrainian economy to reshape its industrial structure in a manner 
compatible with deep economic relations with both Russia and the EU. The pursuit of a 
sound solution to these technical issues could well be the subject of trilateral consultations, 
as long as the political framework for them is clearly understood, namely to prepare a 
common European economic space.         
The fundamental issue remains whether Russia can see that its own economic modernisation 
requires a real common economic space with the EU. At present Russia is set on a strategy of 
denial, i.e. excluding itself from open economic relations with any major, competitive global 
economy. As already remarked Putin seems to acknowledge the overriding need for 
economic modernisation, albeit phrased in rather vague terms. The global competitiveness 
indicators complied by the World Economic Forum show Russia and Ukraine ranked 
respectively in 63rd and 89th place in the ranking of 139 states11. While these rankings are 
already poor, when one looks at the evidence in more detail it is devastating. While these 
                                                   
11 Margareta Drzeniek Hanouz and Alexey Prozdnichnykh, ‘The Russian Competitiveness Report 2011 – 
Laying the Foundations for Sustainable Prosperity’, Eurasian Competitiveness Institute and World 
Economic Forum, 2011.  
AFTER THE VILNIUS FIASCO: WHO IS TO BLAME? WHAT IS TO BE DONE? | 15 
 
two states have human capital endowment that is fairly strong, reflecting past investments in 
education and science, on three accounts the current performance of both countries is 
absolutely disastrous, namely in the functioning of institutions and the rule of law, the 
efficiency and openness of markets, and the effectiveness of financial markets, where the 
rankings average 122nd for Russia and 124th for Ukraine out of 139 countries (i.e. the whole of 
the world except for minor developing countries). The current strategic objective to enlarge 
the customs union to include Ukraine would thus see these two economies mutually 
reinforcing each other in their worst economic performance determinants.  
In theory the alternative choice to link Russia with a large part of the world’s most advanced 
and competitive economies could be centered on economic cooperation and open trade with 
the US, or with China, or the EU. No other global economy has the scale and depth of 
technological wealth to be the relevant partner for Russia that wants to have a competitive 
industrial and service economy beyond the mineral commodity sectors. If these are the 
alternatives, the choice is a no-brainer. For reasons of geographic and cultural proximity, and 
for relative absence of geo-political apprehensions, it has to be the EU. But this would have 
to go also with appreciation by the Russian leadership that its society is changing, in that its 
young post-Soviet elite is, according to opinion surveys and focus group researches12, simply 
not interested in Russia’s old-style geo-politics. They would like to see Russia and its people 
accepted as normal parts of European society, where they already send their children for 
education in large numbers.  
Maybe Russia’s leadership is not yet ready for this, in spite of Putin’s remarks in his state of 
the nation address quoted above. But the evidence is overwhelming, as pointed out in a 
detailed study of the World Economic Forum referred to. Time is not on the side of Russia, 
which may now waste a number of years trying to build up a misconceived Eurasian 
Economic Union, which is bound to become an economically ineffective, financially 
expensive and conflict-ridden failure, even if Putin thinks for the moment that he has been 
scoring geo-political victories.  
Open up new perspectives for a Greater Eurasia 
The EU’s Central Asia policy, called a strategy but hardly living up to its name, also needs 
reconsideration. It was originally fashioned under the slogan ‘the neighbours of the 
neighbours’ implying a diluted version of the neighbourhood policy, and as if Central Asia 
was the territorial end of Europe’s mental map of the world. The policy has hardly achieved 
much impact, and should be radically reframed in the 21st century context in which Europe 
and Asia are, or should be heading for greater integration of what may be called the Greater 
Eurasia, embracing the whole of the European and Asian land masses.  
The new president of China, Xi Jinping, has called in a speech in Astana in May 2013 for an 
economic corridor from ‘Beijing to the Baltic’ across this Greater Eurasia, in which 
Kazakhstan occupies on third of the distance between Beijing and Berlin. The EU already 
seeks to enter into selected wider Asian regional groupings now developing, given that the 
Asian Regional Forum and the East Asian Summit process are already open to some non-
Asian states. The EU has its own Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) process, involving bi-annual 
summit meetings with all of Asia including Russia, yet with the exception of those nearest to 
Europe, namely Central Asia. The ASEM process needs fresh impetus, with its next summit 
due in Milan in November 2014. The opportunity now presents itself to choose ‘connectivity’ 
                                                   
12 Larisa Deriglazova, Andrey Makarychev and Oleg Reut, ‘Russian Foreign Policy – What the Kremlin 
Does Not See’, CEPS Working Document, June 2012. 
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between Europe and Asia as the driving theme for ASEM, in which rail, road, air transport 
connections, energy infrastructures for pipelines and electricity grids, broad-band fibre optic 
network connections are one major category; but alongside these physical infrastructures can 
go enhanced cooperation over soft security threats such as drugs and human trafficking, and 
people-to people initiatives13.  
The Central Asian states should therefore be invited to join the ASEM process, with focus in 
the period ahead on rationalising and improving trans-continental transport corridor 
projects, which currently suffer from disjointed projects of Russia, China with the Asian 
Development Bank in support, and the EU. Kazakhstan aims to be the key transit hub for the 
future growth of Western Europe-Western China traffic, and has made ambitious and 
comprehensive transport development plans with 2020 and 2050 horizons. Its plans include 
links to be made across the Caspian Sea with the new Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line due to 
open in 2104, which would mean demonopolising the Northern Russian transit routes. 
Russia will retain a uniquely important role for obvious reasons of its geographic extent, but 
without monopoly for the trans-Siberian routes, which are not the shortest. There are 
plausible routes from China to Europe that would pass from Kazakhstan into Southern 
Russia and then Eastern Ukraine before reaching the EU, as well as the trans-Caspian and 
trans-Caucasus route. There is also an interesting broad-band fibre-optic project promoted 
by Azerbaijan to join Europe and Asia via Turkey and Kazakhstan, which deserves serious 
consideration. India, and South and South-East Asia, have interests in southern routes 
between Europe and Asia. The ASEM process could take the lead in developing operational 
plans.          
Conclusions 
Putin’s aim to torpedo Vilnius was quite effective for the short run. But his strategy is full of 
weaknesses. Russia’s capacity to subsidise Ukraine away from Europe is limited, but the 
capacity of the Ukrainian people to rise up against corrupt governance at home and bullying 
from Russia is infinite, with the EuroMaidan having served as a marker of what could lie 
ahead. The customs union is useless as an instrument for Russia’s economic modernisation, 
and would be even worse for Ukraine. Moreover the recent renaming of the proposed 
Eurasian Union as the Eurasian Economic Union is signalling Kazakhstan’s refusal of 
political integration.    
The battle chosen by Putin is over European democratic civilisation for the 21st century. His 
revisionist drive is to re-expand the frontiers of political darkness and coercive foreign 
relations. The EU’s neighbourhood policy has been itself defective, but can be repaired. The 
policy has to become more targeted and geo-political, and less a bureaucratic robot for 
demanding indiscriminate compliance with masses of EU laws. The EU can engage 
successfully and peacefully in this battle by pledging to grant to Moldova and Georgia 
membership perspectives on the occasion of their signing their AA/DCFTAs, and pledging 
also the same to a future Ukrainian leadership that was sincerely democratic and credibly 
committed to European integration and cleaned up governance at home.     
But the EU should also signal to Russia that it remains absolutely committed to the noble 
ideal of the common European home, or ‘Lisbon to Vladivostok’ if one likes to call it that. 
The best instrument for pragmatic progress in this direction, and for Russia’s badly needed 
                                                   
13 For a detailed account see Michael Emerson, ‘Towards a Greater EurAsia – Who, Why, What and 
How’, Global Journal of Emerging Market Economics, Vol 6 (1), pp 35-68, Sage Publications, forthcoming, 
February 2014. 
AFTER THE VILNIUS FIASCO: WHO IS TO BLAME? WHAT IS TO BE DONE? | 17 
 
economic modernisation in particular, would be re-activation of the four common spaces, 
with a view to a pan-European free trade area, in which Ukraine in particular could enjoy its 
obvious first-best solution - politically as well as economically - of free trade with both the 
EU and Russia. Legal obstacles like the non-WTO membership of Belarus and Kazakhstan 
would have to be resolved, but first let the strategic objective first be fixed.  
The EU should go further still by entering into the Eurasian arena itself in a bigger and better 
way that Putin’s small and revisionist union. The EU should take the occasion of its next 
summit session in 2014 of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) to propose a Greater Eurasia 
concept, embracing the whole of the European and Asian landmass. All of Asia as well as 
Russia have so far been invited to ASEM summits, except for Central Asia. This should be 
corrected, especially because the most plausible first theme for a Greater Eurasia initiative is 
‘land connectivity’ between the major economies of this vast region, with Kazakhstan 
occupying no less than one third of the space between Beijing and Berlin.   
For the EU in search of strategic ideas suitable for its 2014 parliamentary election and 
leadership renewal, this post-Vilnius agenda could be attractive with its three linked 
components: reconstruction of the neighbourhood policy, reaching for a concordat with 
Russia over Lisbon to Vladivostok, and a Greater Eurasia initiative. And Russians, waiting 
patiently for 150 years for an answer to the vital question What is to be done? might begin to 
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ANNEX A. Numbers of EU legal acts to be complied with in the draft and 
initialled Association Agreements and Deep and 
Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements between the EU and 
Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova 
      Ukraine Georgia Moldova 
Financial services    64  41  41 
Telecommunications    9  6  11 
Postal services     3  3  3 
Road transport    12  12  12 
Railways     12  7  11 
Air transport     1  1  1 
International maritime transport  22  19  21 
Inland waterways    6  0  6 
Taxation     5  7  7 
Environment     28  25  25 
Climate change    6  2  3 
Company law, accounting   14  12  12 
Consumer protection    16  17  16 
Labour law, social policy   39  37  35 
Public health     13  13  13 
Audio-visual     1  1  1 
Energy      27  29  ? 
Nuclear     3  0  0 
Customs     (4)  (4)  4 
Public procurement    (18)  (18)  18 
Competition policy    4  (4)  (4) 
Agriculture     59  (45)  45 
Technical standards    32  21  110 
Total      368  324  428 
 
Note: These lists are illustrative rather than exact and comprehensive. For some sectors it is difficult to 
put a precise number on the EU laws to be complied with, and there are various instances 
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